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COMMENT
THE RULE OF LENITY AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
ANNA CURRIER*
In 1984, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("Chevron")
that courts owe deference to an executive agency's interpretation of a
statute. On November 10, 2014, the Supreme Court in Whitman v.
United States, a criminal insider trading case, denied a petition for writ
of certiorari. In a statement accompanying the denial of certiorari,
Justice Scalia questioned whether a federal court owed deference to an
executive agency's interpretation of a statute that has both criminal and
administrative applications. The crux of Justice Scalia 's concern is that
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission" or
"SEC"), through its rulemaking authority, is usurping the role of
Congress by defining criminal conduct. Specifically, Justice Scalia
reiterated his belief that the rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity
arising from the applicable law in a criminal case must be resolved in
favor of the defendant and that Chevron deference must yield to lenity
where a statute has both criminal and administrative application.
This Comment will examine the impact on the enforcement of the
federal securities laws by the Commission and the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") and whether Chevron deference should be required to
give way to the rule of lenity where a Commission rule or statute has
both criminal and administrative application, specifically Section 1 0(b),
Rule lOb-5, Rule lOb5-1, and Rule 10b5-2. This Comment will also
consider how the application of the rule of lenity will affect the national
market system and the public investors.
* I would like to thank my family and Alan Lieberman for their continued support and
guidance during this process.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. ("Chevron"), it has been settled
law that courts owe deference to an executive agency's interpretation of a
"statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer ..... " The principle, of
whether statutory construction will continue to apply in cases involving the
enforcement of the federal securities laws, is now in question.
Included in Justice Scalia's concurrence in Whitman was an invitation of
sorts, expressing his favorable disposition toward granting certiorari in a
case that presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to decide
1. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
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whether lenity trumps deference where a rule or statute has both
administrative and criminal application.2  The implication of Justice
Scalia's concurrence for the enforcement of the federal securities laws are
unprecedented in their scope and impact.3
In Whitman v. United States, Whitman had been convicted of insider
trading as a secondary tippee,4 and the Second Circuit affirmed his
conviction.5 The Second Circuit followed this rationale in United States v.
Royer, which held that a defendant commits insider trading in violation of
Section 10(b) when he trades "while in knowing possession of nonpublic
information material to those trades." 6 Royer was based in part on the
Court's reading of the Commission's interpretation of Rule lOb5-1 7, which
defines insider trading as a manipulative and deceptive device 8 and adopts
an awareness standard for insider-trading liability under Section 10(b). 9
In December 2014, the Second Circuit ("Court") decided another
criminal insider trading case: United States v. Newman.'0 In Newman, the
2. See Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 352, 354 (2014) ("A court owes
no deference to the prosecution's interpretation of a criminal law .... Whitman does
not seek review on the issue of deference... [s]o I agree with the Court that we should
deny the petition. But when a petition properly presenting the question comes before
us, I will be receptive to granting it.").
3. See generally Matthew T. Martens et al., Scalia's Deference Argument Could
Have Dramatic Effects, LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2014, 11:57 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/597223/scalia-s-deference-argument-could-have-dram
atic-effects (reporting that Justice Scalia's question on whether courts should defer to
agency interpretations of laws subject to criminal and civil enforcement "implicitly
invited litigants to mount challenges" to the judicial practice of deference).
4. United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
("Specifically, the counts charged that Mr. Whitman traded or agreed to trade on
material inside information that he received from tippees who had, in turn, obtained the
information from inside employees .... ).
5. United States v. Whitman, 555 F. App'x. 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding no
error in the jury instruction on appeal and affirming Whitman's conviction).
6. Id. (quoting United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 899 (2d Cir. 2008)).
7. Royer, 549 F.3d at 899 (deferring to the Commission adoption of a knowledge
requirement in Rule 10b5-1).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2011) ("The 'manipulative and deceptive devices'
prohibited by Section 10(b) of the [Securities Exchange] Act (15 U.S.C. § 78j) and
§240.1 Ob-5 ... include.., the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis
of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of
trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that
security or the shareholder of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the
material nonpublic information.").
9. See id. § 240.10b5-I(b) (stating that a purchase or sale of security is "on the
basis of' material nonpublic information if the person making the purchase or sale was
"aware" of the material nonpublic information when the sale was made).
10. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014) (establishing
that appellants Newman and Chiasson were appealing from judgments of conviction
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U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
("Government") argued that it was sufficient to prove a violation under
Rule 10b5-2 by showing that a tippee had traded on material, nonpublic
information with knowledge that the information was tipped in breach of a
fiduciary duty.' The Second Circuit rejected this formulation and,
appearing to implicitly adopt Justice Scalia's approach, the Court embraced
a standard that imposed a heavier burden on the Government. This heavier
burden was exemplified by the Court's holding that a breach of fiduciary
duty is only committed if there is a personal benefit to the tipper, and the
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tippee had
knowledge of both the fiduciary duty and the personal benefit.12  The
Second Circuit in Newman defined personal benefit with specificity; the
Court held that the Government would need to prove a "meaningfully close
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective,
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or
similarly valuable nature," and the Government must bring evidence of "a
relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro
quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the [latter]."' 3 Newman relied
in part on the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC, a civil insider
trading case decided before the Commission had promulgated Rules 10b5-1
and 10b5-2.14
On July 30, 2015, the Government filed a petition for writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court. 5 In the petition, the Government argued that
Newman's holding sharply contrasted with Dirks because the former
opinion articulated a heightened personal benefit requirement that rejected
Dirks' previous definition of personal benefit, a benefit that was explained
by the Second Circuit as one that could be "inferred from a personal
relationship between the tipper and the tippee.
' '16
based on violations of Section 10(b) and Rules 1Ob5-1 and 10b5-2).
11. Id. at 447 (stating that the Government felt it only needed to prove "[t]hat the
'defendants traded on material, nonpublic information they knew insiders had disclosed
in breach of a duty of confidentiality"').
12. Id. at 450.
13. Id.
14. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (decided seventeen years
before Rules lOb5-1 and 10b5-2 were adopted (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2011))
(originally enacted Aug. 24, 2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2011) (originally enacted
Aug. 24, 2000).
15. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 84
U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 15-137).
16. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Newman, (U.S. July 30, 2015)
(No. 15-137), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2015/08/13/newm
an cert petition.pdf (citing United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452).
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This Comment will discuss Newman's potential impact on the
enforcement of federal securities laws. Specifically, it examines whether
subordinating deference to the rule of lenity, combined with a federal
court's denial of deference to the Commission in insider trading
prosecutions brought under Rule 1 Ob-5 as recently seen in Newman, signals
an important change in the enforcement of the federal securities laws in
criminal proceedings.
Section I will review the Commission's rulemaking and enforcement
authority. First, this Section will review the adoption of the Securities Act
of 1934, specifically Section 10(b), and the Commission's subsequent
promulgation of Rule lOb-5, Rule 10b5-1, and Rule lOb5-2, which
interpret Section 10(b). Second, it will review the case law that
implemented Congress' intent that the Commission and DOJ cooperate and
enforce the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Third, it
will discuss the application and importance of Chevron deference to the
Commission's enforcement of the federal securities laws. Fourth, it will
examine the pertinent and relevant case history, demonstrating the federal
courts deference (or lack thereof) to the Commission's interpretation of
Rule lOb-5 for insider trading liability.
The tension between Chevron deference and the rule of lenity is best
understood in the development of the law of insider trading. Section II will
analyze how applying the rule of lenity to the Commission's interpretation
of Rule lob-5 in both civil and criminal cases will affect the Commission's
enforcement power for insider trading cases and, ultimately, the investing
public.
In Section III, this Comment will recommend that federal courts should
apply the rule of lenity in criminal prosecutions for insider trading. This
Comment will conclude by setting the boundaries for Commission
deference in criminal prosecution cases concerning insider-trading liability
under Rule lOb-5.
I. THE SECURITIES LAWS AND THE COMMISSION'S RULEMAKING
AUTHORITY
A. The Commission's Adoption of Rules Implementing Section I 0(b)
In 1933 and 1934, following the market crash of the Great Depression,
1 7
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 193318 (the "Securities Act") and
17. See generally Steve The|, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 407-10 (1990) (describing how the
market crash of 1929 led to enactment of the Securities Exchange Act).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2015).
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the Securities Exchange Act of 193419 (the "Exchange Act"). These laws
were enacted to address and prevent an array of abuses of the public
markets. 20  The principal anti-fraud provision of the Exchange Act is
Section 10(b). Congress determined that the best antidote to securities
fraud was full material disclosure of information to the investing public in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and it created Section
10(b) as the catchall anti-fraud provision. 2 1 Congress delegated rule-
making authority to the Commission to implement the provisions of
Section 10(b).22 In fulfilling this congressional mandate, the Commission
adopted Rule lOb-5, 21 Rule lOb5-1,24 and Rule lOb5-2. 25  Rule lob-5
prohibits the employment of fraudulent or deceitful devices in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. 26 Rule 10b5-1, adopted nearly six
decades after Rule 1Ob-5,
defines when a purchase or sale of securities constitutes trading 'on the
basis of material nonpublic information in insider trading cases brought
under... Rule lOb-5 ... if the person making the purchase or sale of
securities was aware of the material nonpublic information when the
person made the purchase or sale.
27
Rule lOb5-2, adopted in the same year as Rule lOb5-1, prohibits "the
purchase or sale of securities on the basis of, or the communication of,
material nonpublic information misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust
or confidence.,
28
Rule 1Ob-5, adopted in 1942,29 was intended to provide investors an even
19. Id. § 78a (2015).
20. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) ("[The Acts] ... have two basic
components: a prohibition against fraud, and requirements of disclosure when
securities are issued periodically thereafter.").
21. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) ("[Rule 10(b)] was
described.., as a 'catchall' clause to enable the Commission 'to deal with new
manipulative (or cunning) devices."').
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2015) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange ... any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.").
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2011).
24. Id. § 240.10b5-1.
25. Id. § 240.10b5-2.
26. Id. § 240.10b-5 (barring any person from employing any "device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security").
27. Id. § 240.10b5-1.
28. Id. § 240.1Ob5-2 ("misappropriation theory").
29. See Press Release, SEC, No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) (announcing that the
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playing field for trading in the public market. 30 To provide clarity to a rule
that invited varying court interpretation, 3' the Commission promulgated
Rules lOb5-1 and 10b5-2 in 2000.32 The rules seek to prevent insiders
from benefitting from their positions of power by trading on confidential
inside information. 33 A Rule lOb-5 violation occurs when trading relies
upon information that would reasonably be expected to affect the market
- 34price.
B. The Commission's Enforcement Power and Rulemaking Authority
The Commission's Enforcement Division ("Enforcement Division")
investigates and prosecutes those who violate the federal securities laws.
35
The Enforcement Division has broad power to manage investigations of
potential violations of the securities laws through statutory authority.36 The
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 ("Reform Act") significantly enhanced
the enforcement remedies the Commission could seek in federal court and
administrative proceedings. 37  The Act gave administrative law judges
power to impose civil penalties through administrative proceedings.
38
Commission had adopted a rule (Rule lOb-5) prohibiting fraud by any person in
connection with the purchase of securities).
30. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, Inc., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)
(explaining that Rule lob-5 is based in the policy that all investors trading in the
marketplace should have equal access to information).
31. See generally SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 813-14 (2002) (holding that
Section 10(b) should be construed "flexibly" and that the Commission's broad reading
of the statute should be entitled deference).
32. See supra note 15.
33. Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis
of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1922 (2007).
34. Compare Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and Corporate Information
Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV.
1271, 1289 (1965) (explaining importance of disclosures under Rule l0b-5 being
limited to situations that are "extraordinary in nature" and also "which are reasonably
certain to have a substantial effect on the market price if the security is disclosed"),
with Tex. Gulf Sulphur, Inc., 401 F.2d at 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that an insider
may not always be excluded from trading in his own company because he is more
familiar with it than outsiders).
35. Division of Enforcement, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/enforce#.VQ7zMWTF_
Ck. (last modified Apr. 15, 2015).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2015).
37. See Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical
Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J.
CORP & FIN. L. 367, 392-93 (2008) (explaining that the Reform Act formulated a
"tiered" penalty framework that was used to adopt an appropriate penalty for the
circumstances of specific cases).
38. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-429, § 202(a), 104 Stat. 931, 937 (1990).
2015
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The endemic greed and looting of corporate assets and fraudulent
financial reporting that caused the collapse of Enron and WorldCom led to
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley").3 9
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the Commission was able to obtain director and
officer bars in administrative proceedings, 4 0 a remedy the Commission
could previously only obtain in federal court.41  Congress addressed the
2008 financial crisis with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act ("Dodd-
Frank"), which enhanced the Commission's enforcement power and
rulemaking authority. 42  As with the Reform Act and Sarbanes-Oxley,
Dodd-Frank expanded the Commission's penalty options, specifically the
ability to impose civil penalties in administrative cease-and-desist
proceedings brought under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act:
penalties the Commission could previously only obtain in federal court.43
As a result of this enhanced power, the Commission has opted to file more
of its enforcement actions as administrative proceedings, particularly in
insider trading actions.4 4
The Commission has not only been endowed with greater regulatory
powers through legislation, but it has also been influenced by its
Commissioners. Chairwoman Mary Jo White has encouraged the
Commission to enforce the federal securities laws in accordance with a
"broken windows policy"-a policy that seeks to pursue all types of federal
securities violations no matter their severity.45  By expanding the
Commission's reach, Chairwoman White's enforcement program created a
39. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 705(b), 116 Stat. 745,
799-800 (2002) ("Sarbanes-Oxley Act") (requiring the office of the Comptroller
General to submit a report to Congress indicating whether the financial industry had
assisted public companies with fraudulent reporting; regulatory and statutory
recommendations were also to be included in the report).
40. Id. § 1105(a)(f) (granting the Commission authority to proscribe any person
who violates Sectionl0(b) or any "rules or regulations thereunder" from serving as an
officer or director).
41. See Atkins, supra note 37, at 395 (explaining that officer and director bars
were previously only enforced in civil actions after showing of unfitness).
42. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1802 (2010) (hereinafter "Dodd-Frank Act").
43. Id. § 929P.
44. See Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC to File Some Insider-Trading Cases in its In-
house Court, REUTERS (June 11, 2014, 4:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/06/11/sec-insidertrading-idUSL2NOOSIAT20140611 (reporting on Division of
Enforcement Director Andrew Ceresney's comments that the SEC intends to bring
more insider trading cases in the administrative forum).
45. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, SEC, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement
Forum (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539872
100 ("[M]inor violations that are overlooked or ignored can feed bigger ones .... ).
Vol. 5:1
RULE OF LENITY'S IMPACT
system where every market participant is subject to scrutiny.4 6
C. Parallel Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws by the Commission
and DOJ
As a civil agency, the SEC's Enforcement Division brings civil suits in
both federal court and administrative forums.47 The Commission exercises
its discretion in determining whether to prosecute violations in federal
court or in an administrative proceeding.48  The principal anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws have both civil and criminal
applications, and "Congress has expressly authorized the SEC to share
information with the [DOJ] to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of
crimes., 49 The Commission and the DOJ cooperate in prosecuting fraud in
the securities markets, and the two agencies often conduct concurrent
investigations and prosecutions.5 ° The DOJ frequently utilizes Sections
1341, 1343, and 1348 of Title 18 to prosecute violations of federal
securities laws.51 As with Rule lOb-5, these criminal statutes prohibit "a
scheme or artifice to defraud., 52 The DOJ can also use Section 371 of Title
18 to charge conspiracies in violation of securities fraud.53
1. The Commission's and DOJ's Different Burdens
In Steadman v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that Congress intended the
Commission to use a preponderance standard in its proceedings. 54  A
46. See id. (instructing that market participants will be aware of the Commission's
increased presence through the Commission's work with other regulatory agencies,
pursue "deficient gatekeepers," and actively seeking and prosecuting "broken
windows" in the federal securities markets).
47. How Investigations Work, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/
Article/1356125787012#.VPDnELPFCk (last modified July 15, 2013).
48. Id. (recommending which forum the Commission should bring its enforcement
action in).
49. United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 2008).
50. Division of Enforcement Manual, SEC 1, 83 (June 4, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf ("Parallel civil and
criminal proceedings are not uncommon. In furtherance of the SEC's mission ... the
staff is encouraged to work cooperatively with criminal authorities, to share
information, and to coordinate their investigations.").
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1348 (2014).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014)
(explaining that the District Court found Newman guilty "on charges of securities fraud
in violation of Section 10(b) [ ... ] Rules lOb-5, and 10b5-2 [ ... ] and conspiracy to
commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371"); see also United States v.
Newman, No. 12 CR 121(RJS), 2013 WL 1943342 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2013).
54. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 104 (1981) ("The Commission's consistent
practice, which is in harmony with § 7(c) and its legislative history, is persuasive
2015
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preponderance standard, seen as the "[l]ightest burden of proof to modern
law, 55 has traditionally been imposed in civil proceedings.56 In criminal
actions where the rule of lenity is applied, elements of securities fraud must
be proven by the government beyond a reasonable doubt.5' The DOJ, by
having to show that the defendant acted "willfully" in committing a
violation of a federal securities law, is required to prove a heightened
mental state under a higher evidentiary burden.58 Despite the two agencies'
different burdens of proof, their investigations of federal securities law
violations frequently intersect.59  The securities laws also allow the
Commission to share the evidence it accumulates while conducting its civil
investigations with United States Attorneys for the purpose of facilitating a
criminal investigation. 60 In United States v. Stringer, the Ninth Circuit
approved the Commission's role in sharing information with the DOJ to
facilitate the DOJ's own investigation and prosecution of crimes.6 1 The
Commission and the DOJ also liberally share investigation materials. For
example, Form SEC 1662 is sent to all witnesses who are subpoenaed to
authority that Congress intended that Commission disciplinary proceedings, subject to
§ 7 of the APA, be governed by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.").
55. Russell G. Ryan, The SEC's Low Burden of Proof, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2013,
5:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873232975045785822138205
33922.
56. See Annotation, Instructions Defining Term "Preponderance or Weight of
Evidence", 93 A.L.R. 155 (1934) ("There is no doctrine of the law settled more firmly
than the rule which authorizes issues of fact in civil cases to be determined in
accordance with the preponderance or weight of the evidence.").
57. See United States Attorneys' Manual 9-27.300 Selecting Charges-Charging
Most Serious Offense, DOJ (Dec. 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/
foia readingroom/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.300 ("[An attorney for the
government] should not include in an information or recommend in an indictment
charges that he/she cannot reasonably expect to prove beyond a reasonable doubt by
legally sufficient evidence at trial.").
58. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2015) (stating that any person who "willfully
violates any provision of this chapter [including 15 U.S.C. § 78j] or any rule or
regulation thereunder.., shall upon conviction be... imprisoned not more than 20
years .... "), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob5-1 (2011) (stating that a purchase or sale of
security is "on the basis of' material nonpublic information if the person making the
purchase or sale was "aware" of the material nonpublic information when the sale was
made).
59. See Division of Enforcement Manual, supra note 50 (explaining that parallel
criminal and civil proceedings are common and that the Commission should share
investigation materials and coordinate investigations "when appropriate").
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (allowing the Commission to convey evidence
concerning violations of the securities laws to the Attorney General).
61. United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2008) (asserting that the
government's practice of sharing information with the DOJ was not unconstitutional
and that the government is free to conduct "simultaneous criminal and civil
investigations... ").
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62testify before the Commission, and it informs the subpoenaed witness that
any information obtained may be used in a criminal proceeding.
63
Where both the DOJ and the Commission have filed concurrent actions,
it is not unusual for the DOJ to request a stay of the civil proceeding to
64limit the criminal defendant's discovery opportunities. The DOJ's
objective in requesting a motion to stay is to protect its witnesses from
exposure to broad civil discovery.65 Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a party must provide to the opposing party the name,
address, and telephone number of each witness they intend to use, as well
as identify each exhibit the party plans to use at trial.66
D. Chevron Deference
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided a milestone administrative law case,
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., where it
held that a court owes deference to an executive agency's interpretation of
a statute. 67 The Supreme Court enunciated its analysis that must be applied
when reviewing such an interpretation. Specifically, if Congress has
unambiguously spoken on the issue, both the court and the agency must
"give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 68  The
Supreme Court went on to state that, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
62. Division of Enforcement Manual, supra note 50, at 43 (explaining that when
requesting documents or information, the SEC lawyers must provide the witness with
the 1662 form); see also Stringer, 535 F.3d at 934 (stating that Form 1662 is "[a] form
sent to all witnesses subpoenaed to testify before the SEC").
63. Supplemental Information for Persons Requested to Supply Information
Pursuant to a Commission Subpoena § B(5), SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/
forms/sec 1662.pdf
64. See Walter P. Loughlin, Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 22 THE
PRACTICAL LITIGATOR 19, 22-23 (Mar. 2011), http://www.klgates.com/files/Pub
lication/780dc44c-a3af-4b60-8efe-bb6b913fed75/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
bddd 1 cf9-2f07-4d57-b3 8c-bcf3142e589b/LoughlinPracticalLitigator March2011 .pdf
("A parallel civil and criminal case can be an avenue for civil discovery that is not
available in the criminal case, a fact which often prompts a prosecution application for
a stay of the civil case so as to protect its witnesses from exposure to civil discovery.").
65. Id.; see also SEC v. Saad, 229 F.R.D. 90, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (denying the
Government's motion to stay the civil case pending resolution of the criminal action.
Judge Rakoff rejected concerns that defendants would use civil discovery to "special
advantage," noting that the DOJ elected to coordinate the filing of its indictment with
the SEC's civil action).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii).
67. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) ("[The Court has] long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded
to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to agency interpretations.").
68. Id. at 842-43.
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agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. ' 69 It
stressed that legislative regulations should be given deference unless they
are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute., 70 Although
this was not the first case that imposed agency deference,7' it was the first
case to expressly approve agencies' power to fill in gaps in statutory
language, giving executive agencies power to use regulations to define
statutory liability when intended.72
The Chevron holding required judicial deference to agency regulations
that are not unreasonable,73 a holding that conflicts with the rule of lenity.74
The Supreme Court addressed this tension initially in Crandon v. United
States, a civil suit based on a criminal statute.75 It resolved the statutory
ambiguity using the rule of lenity and held that "legislatures, not courts,
define criminal liability., 76 Five years later, the Supreme Court appeared
to change direction in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for
Great Ore, a civil case brought under an Environmental Protection Agency
statute capable of both civil and criminal applications.77 In Babbitt, the
Supreme Court stated that it has "never suggested that the rule of lenity
should provide the standard for reviewing facial challenges to
administrative regulations ... ,78
Most recently, in Leocal v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court reversed a
69. Id. at 843.
70. Id. at 844.
71. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953) (holding that
the National Labor Relations Board holds discretionary authority in effectuating the
policies of the Labor Relations Act based on its insight "gained from experience").
72. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation.").
73. See id. at 844 (holding that agency rule promulgations should be given
deference unless they are "arbitrary" or defy what the statute was intended to address).
74. See Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (expressing that,
pursuant to the rule of lenity, ambiguity in criminal laws should be resolved in favor of
the defendant); see also Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) (articulating that judicial interpretation of ambiguous
legislation concerning criminal liability should be done narrowly in the defendant's
favor).
75. Petitioners were all former employees of Boeing Company. Before all
petitioners left Boeing to accept jobs with the federal government, Boeing made to each
person a payment to mitigate the salary loss expected to occur. The United States filed
a civil complaint under 18 U.S.C. § 209(a), a criminal statute. See generally Crandon
v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990).
76. Id. at 158 (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985)).
77. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 736 n.9
(1995) (explaining elements of the knowledge requirements required for criminal and
civil penalties under the Endangered Species Act).
78. Id. at 704 n.18.
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ruling brought under a statute capable of both civil and criminal
enforcement, applying the rule of lenity. It held that any statutory
ambiguity had to be interpreted in the petitioner's favor to ensure consistent
interpretation. 79 As Crandon, Leocal, and Babbitt illustrate, the Supreme
Court has inconsistently applied the rule of lenity.80 However, unlike the
rule of lenity, the Supreme Court has consistently applied the
Commission's rules in both civil and criminal cases, holding in SEC v.




It is not always clear when Chevron should actually apply.82 Chevron
deference allows executive agencies to construe statutory language and to
clarify a law, power that can infringe upon the courts' role. As Justice
Marshall famously said, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.''83  Chevron's portrayal of
administrative agencies as experts bestows upon these agencies the power
to articulate new policy by devising schemes through promulgating their
own rules.
84
79. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (explaining that, even though the
statute was being considered in Leocal's case in the civil context of deportation, it was
a statute that had both criminal and civil applications, so the rule of lenity needed to be
applied to ensure consistency).
80. See supra notes 75-79 (stating that Crandon read a statute capable of both
criminal and civil enforcement in favor of the defendant using the rule of lenity.
Babbitt did not implement the rule of lenity when interpreting a statute capable of both
criminal enforcement and instead deferred to the administrative regulation. Leocal held
that the rule of lenity needed to apply to a statute in both its criminal and non-criminal
contexts to ensure consistency.).
81. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002) (holding that Section 10(b) has
always been interpreted flexibly and that the SEC's consistent and broad interpretation
of Section 10(b) should be entitled to deference because it is reasonable).
82. Patricia G. Chapman, Has the Chevron Doctrine Run Out of Gas? Senza
Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference or the Rule of Lenity, 19 Miss. C. L. REV. 115, 117
(1998) ("[N]o consistent 'deference' guidelines have been articulated by the Supreme
Court for other courts that must review agency interpretive activities.").
83. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
84. See Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It's A Crime?: Chevron Deference To
Agency Interpretations Of Regulatory Statutes That Create Criminal Liability, 58 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1, 9 (1996) (clarifying the principle of Chevron that courts should defer to
administrators, and that administrator's expertise "gives executive agencies the power
to resolve ambiguous policy objectives in legislation").
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E. Federal Court's Adoption of Deference to Rule lOb-5 in Insider Trading
Cases
1. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading: Disclose or Abstain
A discussion of deference to the Commission's rules begins with In
re Cady, Roberts & Co. ("Cady Roberts"), an administrative proceeding
that established the Commission's standard of corporate insiders having a
duty to disclose material information 85 or, alternatively, abstain from
trading. 86 One of the first cases to adopt the Commission's reasoning in
Cady Roberts was SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, Inc. ("Texas Gulf'). 87 In
Texas Gulf the Second Circuit held that any person in possession of
material nonpublic information-not just officers and directors-must
either disclose it to the investing public or abstain from trading on the
material nonpublic information.88
Nineteen years after Cady Roberts was decided, in Chiarella v. United
States, the Supreme Court endorsed the Commission's holding in Cady
Roberts.89 Although the Court held that insider trading liability under Rule
lob-5 "[was] premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship
of trust and confidence between the parties to the transaction," 90 there was
no such duty between Chiarella and the shareholders of the companies in
whose stock he traded because the shareholders had not placed their trust
and confidence in Chiarella.91 When both Texas Gulf and Chiarella were
decided, Rule lOb-5 was the only Commission Rule promulgated under
92Section 10(b) that reached insider trading.
In 2008, eight years after the Commission had promulgated Rules
10b5-1 and 10b5-2,93 the Second Circuit decided United States v. Royer.94
In Royer, a criminal case, the Court held that a defendant commits insider
trading in violation of Section 10(b) when he trades "'while in knowing
possession of nonpublic information material to those trades." 95 Royer's
85. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
86. Id.
87. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, Inc., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
88. Id at 848.
89. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1980).
90. Id. at 230.
91. Id. at 232-33 ("No duty could arise from [Chiarella's] relationship with the
sellers of the target company's securities, for [Chiarella] had no prior dealings with
them... [h]e was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through
impersonal market transactions.").
92. See supra note 15.
93. Id. § 240.10b5-1,240.10b5-2.
94. See generally United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 2008).
95. Id. at 899.
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holding was based in part on deference to Rule 10b5-1, which defines
insider trading as a manipulative and deceptive device within the meaning
of Section 10(b) and incorporates an awareness standard for insider trading
liability under Section 10(b).9 6
2. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
"Rule 10b5-2 addresses misappropriation of "material nonpublic
information... in breach of a duty of trust or confidence." 97 Rule 10b5-2
delineates the circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or
confidence for purposes of the misappropriation theory.
98
Three years after the Supreme Court, in Chiarella, held that a corporate
outsider did not owe a fiduciary duty to a company's shareholders9 9 and
seventeen years before the Commission promulgated Rule 10b5-2, the
Court decided Dirks.'00 In Dirks, the Court held that a tippee inherits the
duty of the insider not to trade on material nonpublic information "[o]nly
when the insider [tipper] has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information and the tippee knows or should
know that there has been a breach."'' A breach is determined by whether
a financial "benefit" has been obtained.'0 2 In Dirks, the Court did not defer
to the Commission's interpretation of Rule lob-5.'O3
United States v. O'Hagan, decided in 1997, explicitly addressed the
misappropriation theory and held that a person can be liable for insider
trading under Rule lOb-5 "'[w]hen he misappropriates confidential
96. See id. ("[T]he SEC ... enacted Rule 1Ob5-1, adopting a knowing possession
standard, and that determination is itself entitled to deference."); see also United States
v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the "knowing" possession
standard promulgated by the Commission is entitled to consideration and comports
with the disclose or abstain rule from Chiarella).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(a).
98. Id. § 240.10b5-2(b) ("For purposes of this section, a 'duty of trust or
confidence' exists ... : (]) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in
confidence; (2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic
information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history... of sharing
confidences... ; or (3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic
information from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling [ .... ]").
99. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (holding that, as a corporate
outsider, Chiarella did not owe a fiduciary duty to the target company's shareholders
because they did not place their "trust and confidence" in him).
100. See supra note 15.
101. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647 (1983).
102. Id. at 663.
103. Id. at 647 (explaining that the SEC's position "rests on the erroneous theory
that the antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders. A duty to
disclose arises from the relationship between parties and not merely from one's ability
to acquire information because of his position in the market.").
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information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the
source of the information."
' 0 4
II. NEWMAN'S IMPLICIT ADOPTION OF LENITY AND WHAT IT PORTENDS
FOR THE COMMISSION
A. Adopting Lenity in DOJ's Criminal Proceedings
In a criminal insider trading case, deference to the Commission's
interpretation of Rule lob-5 conflicts with the rule of lenity.' 0 5 The rule of
lenity requires that 1) defendants be put on notice about the elements that
constitute a crime and that 2) legislatures, not courts, should define
criminal activity. 0 6 Therefore, a significant result of deference to agency
interpretation is that new crimes can be defined by executive agencies,' 0 7 a
power that traditionally rests solely with the legislative branch.
10 8
1. The Legislative Power to Define Crimes
As a civil agency, the Commission cannot bring criminal prosecutions. 0 9
However, when Chevron deference is given to an executive agency's
interpretation of a law that is capable of both civil and criminal
enforcement, there is an insinuation of a civil agency's rulemaking into
criminal proceedings that raises due process issues. Specifically, it raises
the concern "that laws which regulate persons or entities in society must
give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required."" 0  The due
104. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
105. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (explaining the
fundamental notion of lenity is to resolve a statutory ambiguity in favor of the
defendant).
106. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (asserting that the rule of
lenity is necessary to give "fair warning" to defendants concerning criminal liability,
and because criminal liability can result in loss of freedom and "condemnation of the
community," it should be defined by the legislature).
107. See Whitman, 135 U.S. at 353 (contending that deference to an executive
agency's rule promulgation of a statute contemplating criminal liability allows that
agency to ultimately define crime).
108. Id. ("[L]egislatures not executive officers define crimes [. ] Undoubtedly
Congress may make it a crime to violate a regulation, but it is quite a different matter
for Congress to give agencies-let alone for us to presume that Congress gave
agencies-power to resolve ambiguities in criminal legislation.").
109. See Division of Enforcement, supra note 35 (clarifying that the Division of
Enforcement "conducts investigations into possible violations of the federal securities
laws and prosecutes the Commission's civil suits in the federal courts as well as its
administrative proceedings"); see also Division of Enforcement Manual, supra note 50,
at 104 (explaining that the Commission cannot bring criminal enforcement actions).
110. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).
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process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires this notice."' Such a
constitutional principal is at odds with what Justice Stevens articulated in
Chevron when he reasoned that Congress could delegate to executive
agencies the power to interpret statutory language when authorized and
could promulgate rules that implement policy decisions.' 2  Agencies
possess the power to create policy; however, when these agencies
administer regulations that carry criminal sanctions, the agencies' actions
remove the legislative branch's power to impose punishment rules. The
legislative branch, and not the executive agencies, should be defining
crimes and ordaining the associated punishments.' 13
Chevron deference is not unconstitutional, and the specificity with which
executive agencies interpret statutory language that contemplates both
criminal and civil enforcement is important.'1 4 However, there is a line
between interpreting an ambiguity and creating a new crime, and a
common argument for deferring to an agency's promulgation of a rule, its
expertise on the issue at hand, falls flat when that expertise is used to
determine what conduct merits criminal punishment. 15 Executive agencies
carry out executive functions; because the executive branch does not give
executive agencies the power to "[assess] the societal mores underlying
criminal law [ .... ] The policies supporting special treatment for all
criminal rules outweigh any remaining vitality of the Chevron policies.




The application of the rule of lenity will benefit defendants of criminal
insider trading prosecutions brought under Rule 1Ob-5; therefore, a uniform
basis for criminal liability under Rule lob-5 could help resolve the current
federal circuit split on what behavior constitutes criminal liability." 17
111. See id. (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
112. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
113. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820).
114. See Greenberg, supra note 84, at 17 (conceding that courts expect agencies to
fill in gaps because it is unrealistic to assume Congress can predict every possible
"ramification" of a law).
115. Mark D. Alexander, Note, Increased Judicial Scrutiny for the Administrative
Crime, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 612, 622 (1992) ("The expertise theory of administrative
agencies is problematic when used to resolve any value judgment, but is particularly
difficult when the determination of societal mores is at issue. Agencies have no
expertise to determine what conduct deserves the criminal penalty.").
116. Id. at646.
117. Compare United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447-48, 452 (2d. Cir. 2014)
(holding that the personal benefit standard requires "proof of a meaningfully close
personal relationship" between the tipper and tippee that results in an "objective" and
"consequential" exchange with "potential" economic value), with United States v.
Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a personal benefit is
satisfied pursuant to Dirks when an insider discloses nonpublic material information to
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Furthermore, achieving clarity and consistency in the elements of a
criminal insider trading case brought under Rule lOb-5 will satisfy the fair
notice requirement of due process. 18 Although the Second Circuit in
Newman did not explicitly discuss Chevron or the rule of lenity, the
balancing of those two competing notions is complicit in the Second
Circuit's holding that liability should only be imposed under Rule 10b5-2 if
the government proves the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by receiving a
personal benefit that went beyond mere friendship and that the tippee knew
about the breach of the fiduciary duty. 119 This standard expanded the
language initially articulated in Dirks, a case decided before the
promulgation of Rule 10b5-2 or Chevron.120
2. Judicial Adoption of the Rule of Lenity
The Supreme Court has analyzed the tension between the Chevron
deference and the rule of lenity since the Chevron decision in 1984.2,
Crandon v. United States, decided in 1990, was a civil suit based on 18
U.S.C. § 209(a), which criminalizes payment by a private party-and
receipt by a government employee-of "[s]upplemental compensation for
the employee's government service."' 122 Concerning the meaning of the
statute, the Supreme Court held that, because the "[g]oveming standard is
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage.' ' 123 The
Supreme Court ultimately interpreted the statute's ambiguity in favor of the
petitioners.
24
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Crandon addressed the notion of
deference to the government's interpretation of a criminal statute:
a "relative or friend").
118. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012)(explaining that the Due Process clause requires clarity in executive agency
regulations).
119. Newman, 773 F.3d at 447-48, 452.
120. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (explaining that, when an insider
discloses material inside information, it is only a breach of fiduciary duty when that
insider receives some sort of personal benefit or gain).
121. See Greenfield, supra note 74, at 38-40 ("Although the Supreme Court has not
yet decided how a conflict between Chevron deference and the rule of lenity should be
resolved, it has briefly discussed the issue in [Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152
(1990) and Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687
(1995)].").
122. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 154 (1990).
123. Id. at 158.
124. Id. at 168 ("To the extent that any ambiguity over the temporal scope of [the
statute] remains, it should be resolved in the petitioners' favor unless and until
Congress plainly states that its intent has been misconstrued.").
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The law in question, a criminal statute, is not administered by any agency but
by the courts. [ ... ] The Justice Department, of course, has a very specific
responsibility to determine for itself what this statute means, in order to decide
when to prosecute; but we have never thought that the interpretai, Qn of those
charged with prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference.
Justice Scalia wrote another dissent, five years later, in Babbitt. Babbitt
was an environmental law case where the Supreme Court affirmed the
Secretary of the Interior's promulgation of a rule defining "harm" under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, a law that had both criminal and civil
applications.126 The Supreme Court did not apply the rule of lenity, stating
that it had "never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the
standard for reviewing facial challenges to administrative
regulations whenever the governing statute authorizes criminal
enforcement."'' 27 In Whitman, Justice Scalia recalled that the Supreme
Court in Babbitt deferred "with scarcely any explanation, to an agency's
interpretation of a law that carried criminal penalties."' 28 Justice Scalia
expressed his continued disagreement with this outcome, as it controverted
previous federal court decisions which held that if a law was capable of
both criminal and civil enforcement then the rule of lenity should apply in
both the criminal and civil proceedings. 1
29
In 2004, in Leocal, the petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the
United States, violated Florida law when he was convicted of driving under
the influence of alcohol ("DUI") and of causing serious bodily injury in an
accident. 30 An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals
classified the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and ordered the petitioner to
be deported. 13 1 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.1 32 Although
the pertinent statute was used in a noncriminal context (for deportation),
the statute had both criminal and civil applications. 33 This dual application
permitted the Court to apply the rule of lenity and interpret any statutory
125. Id. at 177 (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
696 n.9 (1995) (clarifying that the Secretary of the Interior's definition of the harm
under 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) "is limited to 'act[s] which actually kil[l] or injur[e]
wildlife' and that one must knowingly violate the Endangered Species Act to be
subject to criminal or severe civil liability).
127. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 704, n.18.
128. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014).
129. See id. at 353-54 (contending that the Babbitt Court's refusal to apply lenity
goes against case precedent that clearly states if a law is capable of both civil and
criminal applications, the rule of lenity "governs its interpretation in in both settings").
130. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 3 (2004).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 13.
133. Id. at I In.8.
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ambiguity in Leocal's favor to ensure consistent interpretation.' 34
B. Applying the Rule of Lenity in the Commission's Civil Proceedings
The cases presented in the previous section, unlike Newman, were civil
cases, yet the Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity in both Crandon and
Leocal because the statutes at issue were capable of both criminal and civil
applications. Applying the rule of lenity to civil enforcement actions
potentially will impede the SEC's robust enforcement initiatives under the
Commission's Chairwoman, Mary Jo White.' 35  Chairwoman White has
been vocal in advocating a "broken windows" approach to enforcement,
holding that no violation is too small to pursue.'
36
However, SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar has expressed
skepticism about the broken windows enforcement policy, suggesting that
its zero-tolerance policy ultimately harms the Commission's regulatory
role.'37 Commissioner Piwowar noted that by adopting a broken windows
approach to enforcement actions, the Commission's mission becomes
diluted; "If you create an environment in which regulatory compliance is
the most important objective for market participants, then we will have lost
sight of the underlying purpose for having regulation in the first place."'
' 38
The Commission's administrative power further increased with the 2010
implementation of Dodd-Frank, granting the Commission power to impose
civil penalties. These were penalties the Commission could previously
seek only in federal court: in administrative cease-and-desist proceedings
brought under violations of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act. 139  Dodd-Frank also expanded the reach of the Commission by
allowing it to bring administrative actions against any unregistered
134. See id. (holding that Leocal's DUI could not be found to be a crime of violence
under section 16, under the principle that any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved
in Leocal's favor).
135. SEC Biography: Chair Mary Jo White, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/comm
issioner/white.htm#.VQ8aV2TFCk (last updated July 23, 2013).
136. See White, supra note 45 ("[M]inor violations that are overlooked or ignored
can feed bigger ones, and, perhaps more importantly, can foster a culture where laws
are increasingly treated as toothless guidelines. And so, I believe it is important to
pursue even the smallest infractions. Retail investors, in particular, need to be
protected from unscrupulous advisers and brokers, whatever their size and the size of
the violation that victimizes the investor.").
137. See Michael S. Piwowar, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks to the Securities
Enforcement Forum 2014 (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1370543156675 (explaining that the Commission's mission is to have a
strong capital market, not solely to achieve regulatory compliance).
138. Id.
139. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1802, 1862 (2010).
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individual. 140  With these increased powers, administrative proceedings
have become the Commission's forum of choice for insider trading
actions. 141
The Commission has distinct advantages in its administrative forum.
42
Along with being tried by a Commission-appointed administrative law
judge, 143 administrative proceedings differ in important ways from those of
a federal court: 1) the proceedings are limited in their discovery process,
most notably in that a defendant cannot conduct discovery depositions; 2)
the out of court investigation testimony of the Commission is freely
admitted; and 3) there is no right to a trial by jury in an administrative
proceeding. 1
44
Dodd-Frank expands the Commission's administrative enforcement
power through Section 929P(a), which enables the Commission to obtain
virtually everything it could obtain through federal court proceedings
through internal administrative proceedings. 45  These increased
enforcement powers, along with the implicit adoption of lenity in Newman,
may prompt the Commission to move its insider trading cases to the
administrative forum. 146 In an administrative proceeding, federal courts
140. Id.
141. See Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC to file some insider-trading cases in its in-house
court, REUTERS (June 11, 2014, 4:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
06/11 /Commission-insidertrading-idUSL2NOOS I AT2014061 1.
142. See Andrew Ceresney, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement, Remarks to the
American Bar Association's Business Law Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 14, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297#.VQ3AEmTFCk
("First, administrative actions produce prompt decisions. [ ... ] Second, administrative
proceedings have the benefit of specialized factfinders [sic]. [ ... ] Third, the rules
governing administrative hearings provide that ALJs should consider relevant evidence.
In practice, what this means is that ALJs are guided by, but not obligated to strictly
apply, the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-l(a) (2015) ("The [SEC] shall have the authority to
delegate ... any of its functions to a division of the Commission, an individual
Commissioner, an administrative law judge.., including functions with respect to
hearing, determining, ordering, certifying, reporting, or otherwise acting as to any
work, business, or matter.").
144. See Alan M. Lieberman, Fast Track Justice: Is the SEC Exercising
'Unchecked and Unbalanced Power'? ", 20 WESTLAW J. SECS. LITIG. & REGULATION 1,
1-4 (Sept. 18, 2014) http://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/WLJ SCL 2010 Comm
entary_Lieberman.pdf (explaining several ways in which the Commission has
'advantages in the administrative forum).
145. Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. District Judge, U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York, Keynote Address at the PLI Securities Regulation Institute: Is the
Commission Becoming a Law Unto Itself? (Nov. 5, 2014) at 5,
http://media.jrn.com/documents/secaddress.pdf.
146. See id. at 7, 9-10 (explaining that, given the expansion of administrative
powers by Dodd-Frank and the Commission's hope to avoid defeat in federal courts,
the Commission may begin bringing cases in administrative proceedings).
2015
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
give an administrative law judge's decision deference, so an administrative
judge effectively makes the law. 147 If the rule of lenity applied to both
criminal prosecutions and civil administrative proceedings, the
Commission would lose a key advantage of bringing enforcement actions
in its administrative forum because courts would no longer give these
administrative actions Chevron deference.
148
C. Limiting the Rule ofLenity to DOJ's Criminal Proceedings
In Newman, as in any criminal case, the Government needed to prove
each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.149 Furthermore, the
Government was obligated to prove that the defendant committed the
violations "willfully," a more advanced mental state than the awareness
standard the Commission must meet in civil cases brought under Rule
10b5-1. 50 The application of both Chevron deference and the rule of lenity
requires a statutory ambiguity to be applied. The statutory ambiguities
identified by the Second Circuit in Newman were resolved in favor of
Newman, and the Court implicitly applied the rule of lenity in two ways.
First, it resolved the statutory ambiguity regarding the tippee's mental
requirement of knowledge, and it explicitly held that the tippee must have
knowledge of both the tipper's breach of fiduciary duty and the tipper's
personal benefit. 151 Second, the Court went further than Dirks and resolved
the ambiguity of what a personal benefit actually is, 52 a standard first
articulated in Dirks. 53 The Court held in Newman that mere friendship
147. Id. at 10.
148. See id. (explaining that an administrative law judge's ruling on an "undecided
issue of statutory interpretation of the securities law is, just like rules enacted by the
Commission, entitled to 'Chevron' deference").
149. See supra notes 54-57 (noting the Commission, as a civil agency, is held by
the courts to a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, whereas DOJ is held to
a beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
150. See supra note 59.
151. Compare United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 450 (2d. Cir. 2014)
(holding explicitly that a tippee's insider trading liability is predicated on the tippee's
knowledge of both the tipper's breach of fiduciary duty and the tipper's receipt of a
personal benefit), with Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660-62 (1983) (holding that
liability shall be imposed when the tippee knows there has been a breach of fiduciary
duty. The tippee's knowledge of the tipper's personal benefit is implicit because
whether a tipper has breached his fiduciary duty hinges on whether he will personally
benefit from the tip.).
152. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (articulating a specific personal benefit standard,
namely a relationship that is significant and results in a "consequential" exchange with
"potential" economic value).
153. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 ("[T]he initial inquiry is whether there has been a
breach of duty by the insider [ .... ] i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or
indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational
Vol. 5:1
RULE OF LENITY'S IMPA CT
between the tipper and the tippee is not enough to establish a personal
benefit. 
54
It is only necessary to apply the rule of lenity to a criminal proceeding
for insider trading violations. If all of the insider trading violation elements
articulated in Newman are proven, then the conviction would subsume the
preponderance of the evidence standard the Commission would be required
to prove in a civil proceeding: a proceeding that would have likely been
stayed pending the outcome of the criminal proceeding.15 5 However, if the
government cannot prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal proceeding, a district court judge or an administrative law judge
could then appropriately apply Chevron deference to the Commission's
rule promulgations. The Commission would need to prove each element
by a preponderance of the evidence standard in a civil proceeding. 1
56
Andrew Ceresney, Director of the SEC Enforcement Division, has
publicly stated that Newman is not likely to inhibit the Commission's
pursuit of insider trading cases.157  However, Newman has affected
administrative proceedings as well as district court decisions. In February
2015, Administrative Law Judge Jason Patil ordered the Commission to
show that the respondent in an administrative proceeding had received a
significant personal benefit that went beyond mere friendship in exchange
for tipping a trader with material inside information.158 In the Southern
District of New York, myriad defendants cited the Newman ruling in
various applications for review in criminal proceedings brought by DOJ.
59
benefit that will translate into future earnings.").
154. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (holding that if the Government were allowed to
meet its burden by proving two people by the mere fact of friendship, the requirement
would be a "nullity").
155. See Loughlin, supra note 64, at 22-23 (explaining that DOJ frequently
requests a stay in the civil proceedings to protects its witnesses from broad civil
discovery).
156. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 103 (1981) (holding that Congress
intended that the Commission's proceedings should be governed by a preponderance of
the evidence standard subject to § 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act).
157. Stephanie Russell-Kraft, SEC's Ceresney Isn't Sweating 2nd Circ. "s Newman
Ruling, LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/620472/
sec-s-ceresney-isn-t-sweating-2nd-circ-s-newman-ruling (reporting that Mr. Ceresney's
statement at a Practicing Law Institute event that Newman is not likely to change the
Commission's approach to insider trading cases involving tippee liability because the
Commission is subject to a lower burden of proof and has the ability to bring actions in
other forums).
158. In re Gregory T. Bolan, Jr. and Joseph C. Ruggieri, Admin. Proc. 3-16178,
Administrative Proceedings Rulings Release No. 2309 (Feb. 12, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/alj/alj orders/201 5/ap-2309.pdf.
159. Max Stendahl, Bharara Foes Pounce on Newman Ruling in SDNY, LAw360
(Feb. 13, 2015, 4:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/620971/bharara-foes-
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Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, raised
concerns about the impact of Newman in his petition for a rehearing en
banc following the Newman ruling, 160 as well as the Commission's
subsequent amicus brief in support of the petition.' 61  The petition for
rehearing contended that Newman "[b]reaks with Supreme Court and
Second Circuit precedent, conflicts with the decisions of other circuits, and
threatens the effective enforcement of the securities laws... [by]
engender[ing] confusion among market participants, parties, judges, and
juries."' 62 The petition noted that Newman's definition of personal benefit
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Dirks.163 As for the
impact on investors, the petition noted that Newman's holding put in
jeopardy the Commission's ability to continue its robust enforcement of
insider trading violations, a bulwark of its primary mission of protecting
investors. 
64
The Second Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc on April 3,
2015."' On July 30, 2015, the Government filed a petition for writ of
certiorari in the Supreme Court. 16 6 The petition presented and asked the
Court to resolve a narrow issue: whether insider trading liability under the
misappropriation theory requires that the personal benefit the tipper
receives be a product of a "meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature."'' 67 In the
petition, the Government argued that the Newman holding departed from
Dirks because it imposed a heightened personal benefit requirement that
pounce-on-newman-ruling-in-sdny.
160. Petition of the United States for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, United
States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837) [hereinafter United
States Petition Rehearing En Banc].
161. Commission's Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting
the Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, United States v.
Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837).
162. United States Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 160,
at 1-2.
163. Id. at 13-14 (explaining that the Second Circuit used the personal benefit
language from Dirks but "upended" it in a way that was "inconsistent with Dirks").
164. Id. at 23 (explaining as an example that Newman's heightened personal benefit
standard could permit tippers to reveal material inside information to a tippee and avoid
liability "because the tipper ""did not expect any pecuniary or 'similar' value in
return").
165. United States v. Newman, Order No. 13-1837(L), 13-1917(Con), 2015 WL
1954058, at *1 (2d. Cir. Apr. 3, 2015).
166. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Newman, (U.S. July 30,
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rejected Dirks' holding that a personal benefit could be "inferred simply by
a personal relationship between the tipper and the tippee. ' ' 168 On October
5, 2015, the petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court.
1 69
In United States v. Salman, Judge Rakoff, sitting by designation,
eschewed the Second Circuit's holding in Newman. Instead, Judge Rakoff
referred to Dirks, holding that proof of a personal benefit only requires
"proof that the insider disclosed material nonpublic information with the
intent to benefit a trading relative or friend . . . . ,170 Judge Rakoff, citing
Dirks,' held that a personal relationship between the tipper and the tippee
satisfies the personal benefit element. 17  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
held that a breach of fiduciary duty (and thus the tipper's personal benefit)
can be established when an insider discloses confidential information to
someone with whom the insider has a personal relationship; no enhanced
"tangible benefit" articulated by Newman is necessary to establish
liability. 172
Due process requires that defendants be given fair notice as to what
conduct could result in criminal liability. 73 While varying court opinions
interpreting Rule lOb-5, Rule l0b5-I, and Rule 10b5-2 are appropriate in
the civil arena,174 criminal liability needs to be defined with more
specificity to avoid "[r]andomly sacrificing individuals on the altar of
investor confidence."'' 75 In Newman, the Second Circuit ultimately used
language that resolved the ambiguity in Rule lob-5 in favor of the
defendant. 1 6 Although the Second Circuit did not explicitly invoke the
168. Id. at 452.
169. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct.
242 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 15-137).
170. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2015).
171. Id. at 1093 (declining to apply Newman's personal benefit standard and
holding instead that a personal benefit is satisfied pursuant to Dirks when an insider
discloses nonpublic material information to a "relative or friend").
172. Id. ("[The Defendant] argues that because there is no evidence that [the tipper]
received any such tangible benefit in exchange for the inside information, or that [the
Defendant] knew of any such benefit, the Government failed to carry its burden. To the
extent Newman can be read to go so far, we decline to follow it.").
173. See Bach Hang, The SEC's Criminal Rulemaking in Rule 10b5-2:
Incarceration Should Be Made of Sterner Stuff 41 WASHBURN L.J. 629, 653 (2002)
(explaining that due process requires defendants to be on notice of what behavior
constitutes as criminal and could therefore lead to imprisonment).
174. Id. (arguing that developing the misappropriation theory on individualized
facts may be appropriate in the civil arena but determining criminal liability on an "ill-
defined" definition can have negative repercussions).
175. Id.
176. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d. Cir. 2014) (rejecting the
Government's argument and holding that the tippee's knowledge of both the breach of
fiduciary duty and of the personal benefit is necessary to impose criminal liability).
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rule of lenity, Chevron deference, or mention Whitman in its holding, the
Second Circuit's reasoning reconciles each of these principles implicitly in
its language and ruling in favor of Newman. 177  This implicit judicial
adoption of the rule of lenity in a criminal proceeding rejects the
Commission's interpretation of insider trading rules. Newman, by defining
criminal liability with clear and specific language, performs its judicial
function of interpreting Congress' language in Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. 78 Ultimately, this clear language protects investors and
bolsters their confidence in participating in a federal securities market that
does not impose arbitrary standards for criminal liability.
D. The Circuit's Differing Interpretations of Dirks and the Supreme
Court's Denial of Certiorari
In Newman, the Second Circuit went beyond the "trading relative or
friend" language used by the Dirks court 179 and defined personal benefit
with specificity. 180 Salman, in contrast, held that since the defendant had
received an insider trading tip from someone considered a "relative or
friend," that was sufficient to establish liability.181 Newman argued in his
brief in opposition to certiorari that Newman's holding remains consistent
with Dirks.8 2  Newman further argued that the Second Circuit
appropriately used Dirks' language to articulate a more detailed standard of
tipper liability that defines when a tipper's disclosure results in a significant
personal benefit.1 83 The Second Circuit's language in Newman articulates a
177. See id. at 447-48, 452 (resolving the ambiguity regarding the knowledge
requirement of the tippee and what a personal benefit actually is by holding 1) that the
tippee must know about both the tipper's breach of fiduciary duty and his personal
benefit, and 2) that the personal benefit requires proof of "a meaningfully close
personal relationship" that results in an exchange with potential pecuniary value).
178. National Conference of State Legislatures, Separation of Powers-An
Overview, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-
an-overview.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2015) (explaining that the judicial branch's role
is to interpret the laws passed by Congress).
179. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
180. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (articulating a heightened personal benefit
standard requiring a relationship that goes beyond mere friendship and that results in an
exchange with potential economic value).
181. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015).
182. See Brief for Todd Newman in Opposition at 21, United States v. Newman 773
F.3d 438 (2d. Cir. 2014) (No. 15-137) (explaining that the Second Circuit
acknowledged and used the relevant personal benefit language first articulated in Dirks
when defining liability in Newman).
183. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (noting that, in circumstances where there is a
close personal relationship between the tippee and the tipper that is meaningful,
significant, and goes beyond "mere friendship," a reasonable inference of a personal
Vol. 5:1
RULE OF LENITY 'S IMPACT
specific standard that market participants will know has potential criminal
implications.
1 8 4
The petition presented a narrow issue for the Supreme Court to
consider: whether Newman's personal benefit holding contravened
Dirks.185 The broader issue of Chevron deference was not raised in the
Government's petition for certiorari. On October 5, 2015, the petition for
certiorari was denied. 186  As is customary, the Supreme Court did not
articulate a reason for this denial. 18 It is possible the Supreme Court will
take the opportunity to decide whether the rule of lenity trumps Chevron
deference when a more explicit presentation of the issue comes along.
Justice Scalia, in his accompanying statement in Whitman, has already sent
a strong signal inviting a case that squarely presents the Chevron issue.'
88
III. RECONCILING THE RULE OF LENITY WITH THE COMMISSION'S
ENFORCEMENT POWER
Lenity is a historical rule of criminal law that is based on due process
principles of notice and the legislature's right to define crimes. 189 The issue
of whether the rule of lenity is required to be applied in the Commission's
enforcement proceedings evokes a fundamental structure of the United
States: the separation of powers.19° The legislative branch enacts the laws;
the executive branch enforces the laws enacted by the legislative branch;
and the judicial branch interprets the laws enacted by the legislative branch
and the rules promulgated by the executive branch. 191 Justice Scalia made
benefit to the tipper is created).
184. Id. (contending that Newman's heightened personal benefit standard puts
market participants on notice about whether they partake in a personal relationship that
could "trigger an inference" of a personal benefit).
185. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Newman, (U.S. July 30,
2015) (No. 15-137), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2015/08/13/
newmancertpetition.pdf
186. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct.
242 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 15-137).
187. Id.
188. See Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 354 (2014) ("But when a
petition properly presenting the question [of deference to the Commission] comes
before us, I will be receptive to granting it.").
189. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (explaining that the rule of
lenity is founded on two policies that have long been part of the Court's tradition: first,
defendants have a right to fair notice about what the law is, and second, that
legislatures should ultimately define crime).
190. See Greenfield, supra note 74, at 12 ("The rule that penal laws are to be
construed strictly.., is founded.., on the plain principle that the power of punishment
is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the
Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.").
191. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 178.
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clear, in his statement accompanying the Court's denial of certiorari in
Whitman, that the executive branch has usurped the function of the
legislative branch through its rulemaking authority and has enabled this
usurpation by applying Chevron deference in criminal cases.
1 92
The Commission's "mission of protecting investors; maintaining fair,
orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitating capital formation" is vital to
ensuring a strong national market.' 93 However, as part of the executive
branch, the Commission is not empowered to define crimes.' 94 Using the
rule of lenity in criminal prosecutions under Rule 1Ob-5, the promulgation
of a rule of significant importance and of routine use could create a fair
system that respects due process as well as the Commission's expertise and
mission of protecting investors. Applying the rule of lenity to every law
that contemplates both criminal and administrative enforcement would
have widespread ramifications, as many of the Commission's laws
contemplate both civil and criminal liability.'
95
Arguably, "[a court should not] interpose its own construction when the
Commission's expertise is more adept at dealing with the complex nature
of mutual fund structures, market transactions, and unique or novel forms
of fraud."' 9 6 The Commission is adept at dealing with the complex nature
of the securities market, but the enforcement of criminal laws has never
been a power delegated to the Commission. The rule of lenity is a standard
of interpretation that should be used only when criminal penalties are at
stake.' 97
To balance these conflicting interests, lenity should be applied in
criminal proceedings only. This recommendation has proved feasible when
using Newman as the framework. It is only necessary to apply the rule of
lenity to a criminal proceeding for insider trading violations brought by the
DOJ; if the government could obtain a conviction by proving beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the insider trading violation elements articulated by
192. See Whitman v. United States, 135 U.S. 342, 353 (2014) (contending that
legislatures rather than executive officers should articulate crimes and that judicial
deference to executive rule promulgations where criminal liability is at stake allows the
executive agency (rather than the legislature) to define criminal conduct).
193. Atkins, supra note 37, at 369.
194. Whitman, 135 U.S. at 353.
195. Martens, Scalia's Deference Argument Could Have Dramatic Effects, supra
note 3 (stating that adoption of Justice Scalia's lenity argument in Whitman could
extend to claims brought under the Securities Act, the Investment Company Act, the
Investment Advisors Act, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
196. Matthew P. Wynne, Rule lOb-5(b) Enforcement Actions in Light of Janus:
Making the Case for Agency Deference, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2111, 2148 (2013).
197. See Greenfield, supra note 74, at 60 ("The Chevron presumption, which opts
for a blanket rule of deference over a case-by-case determination of whether Congress
intended a particular result, is inappropriate where criminal penalties are at issue.").
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Newman, then that conviction would subsume the preponderance of the
evidence standard the Commission is required to prove in a civil
proceeding. 198 However, if the Government could not prove the elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, Chevron deference could then be appropriately
applied to the Commission's rule promulgations in a civil proceeding, and
the Commission will be bound to prove each and every element by a
preponderance of the evidence standard. 99 Adopting the rule of lenity,
rather than deferring to the Commission under Chevron in insider trading
prosecutions, is ultimately a way to preserve a defendant's due process
rights while still ensuring that the Commission's administrative powers are
not stripped from the agency.
CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia's voiced disapproval of applying Chevron deference in a
criminal context, in conjunction with the Second Circuit's holding in
Newman, represents a judicial shift away from administrative deference
when criminal liability is at stake under Rule lob-5. The rule of lenity is
appropriate only in criminal proceedings brought under Rule lob-5. Due
process principles need to be upheld by the defendant's right to be
informed of what constitutes criminal liability, and it is not within the
Commission's power to define criminal liability. It is important to allow
the Commission to maintain its mission of protecting investors by allowing
Chevron deference to the Commission's interpretation of Rule 1 Ob-5 only
in civil proceedings when civil penalties are at stake. Ultimately, investors
will benefit from more narrowly drawn rules, defining criminal conduct
and allowing for more uniformity in judicial interpretation of the
Commission's rules.
198. See Loughlin, supra note 64, at 22-23 (explaining that DOJ prosecution
frequently requests a stay of civil proceedings for discovery purposes).
199. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 103 (1981) (concluding that Congress
intended the preponderance standard to apply in civil proceedings directed by the
Commission).
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